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INTRODUCTION
At one time, the United States Department of Justice was in the
forefront of the movement to protect the rights of persons institu-
tionalized in mental hospitals, mental retardation centers and ju-
venile training schools. Congress, the courts, advocates for
disabled people, and disabled people themselves looked to the Jus-
tice Department for its advocacy and leadership.' Few of the ma-
Clinical Lecturer and Acting Director, Criminal Justice Clinic, The American
University, Washington College of Law. A.B. Cornell University (1974); J.D.,
Yale Law School (1977). The author was a trial attorney in the Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, from 1977-1982. The
author gratefully acknowledges support provided during the preparation of
this Article by The American University Washington College of Law Re-
search Fund.
1. This Article focuses on the Department of Justice's changing role in protect-
ing the rights of mentally disabled people, primarily those in institutions.
Many of the same points could be made about the Department's stance in
prison reform litigation. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, No. GC 71-6-K, order at 2-3
(N.D. Miss. Jan. 6, 1983), quoted in American Civil Liberties Union, In Con-
tempt of Congress and the Courts: The Reagan Civil Rights Record 4 (Feb.
27, 1984) (order dismissing Department from portion of case because its "liti-
gation interest was no longer in accord with court's orders or plaintiff class's
interests") [hereinafter cited as ACLU Report]. Similar issues arise in litiga-
tion and issuance of regulations on behalf of non-institutionalized disabled
persons. See Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Institu-
tional Care and Services for Retarded Citizens: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 121-28 (1983) (Memorandum of Resignation from the De-
partment of Justice, Timothy M. Cook); id. at 163-64 (Statement of Timothy
M. Cook) [hereinafter cited as Senate Enforcement Hearing]. Throughout
this Article the terms "institutionalized persons" or "institutionalized dis-
abled persons" will be used to refer to those persons institutionalized in so-
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jor cases in the area of institutional reform litigation proceeded
without the active involvement and support of the Department. In
serving as an advocate for institutionalized and non-institutional-
ized disabled people alike, the Justice Department upheld the no-
blest traditions of governmental commitment to the principles of
due process and equal protection for all its citizens.
To be sure, not everyone supported the role of the Justice De-
partment in institutional reform litigation. State and local officials
responsible for operating institutions chafed at what they regarded
as the Federal government's unwarranted intrusion into their af-
fairs. As defendants they were naturally unhappy with being sub-
jected to the blizzard of civil discovery techniques - such as
depositions, interrogatories, and tours of their facilities by expert
witnesses - that the Justice Department employed in preparing
its cases. Many believed that if left to their own devices they
would be able to improve institutional conditions to a constitution-
ally acceptable level. Some of these same officials were subse-
quently elected to the United States Senate, where they led the
ultimately unsuccessful opposition to the Civil Rights of Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (CRIPA),2 a 1980 statute that provided leg-
islative authority for the Justice Department to sue state and local
officials to redress unconstitutional and illegal institutional condi-
tions. CRIPA had become necessary because of the decisions in
United States v. Solomon 3 and United States v. Mattson,4 in which
the respective courts had held that, absent a specific statute, the
Justice Department did not have authority to sue state officials on
behalf of institutionalized mentally disabled persons. After the en-
actment of CRIPA, however, advocates for disabled individuals
had reason to believe that a new era was about to dawn: one in
which the Justice Department could use its considerable resources
to seek vindication of the rights of institutionalized individuals
rather than expend them upholding its right to be in court at all.
With the election of the Reagan Administration, however, the
historic position of the Justice Department as protector of the
rights of institutionalized persons, and the promise represented by
the passage of CRIPA, eroded substantially. As a result, the De-
partment was caught in a seemingly endless barrage of criticism
concerning its civil rights policies generally and its commitment to
the rights of disabled people in particular. Critics charged that the
Administration interpreted Supreme Court cases in the field in an
called "treatment" institutions, such as mental retardation centers and
mental hospitals.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1982).
3. 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), afid, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
4. C.A. No. 74-138-BU (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1976), affid, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).
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unduly restrictive manner; reversed long-standing positions taken
in pending cases to the detriment of institutionalized disabled per-
sons; squandered the authority conferred on it by Congress by
bringing virtually no new cases under CRIPA; caused the mass ex-
odus of attorneys who had worked in its Special Litigation Section,
thereby losing the institutional memory that was one reason for
the Department's past effectiveness; and showed such solicitous-
ness for the prerogatives of state officials that in some cases it was
unwilling to be as protective of institutionalized persons' rights as
the state officials themselves. 5
The Administration has not stood silent in face of these criti-
cisms, arguing that it is as committed to upholding the civil rights
of the nation's institutionalized persons as previous administra-
tions.6 In essence, the Administration makes four broad points in
its defense. It argues that the law has changed respecting the
rights of institutionalized persons, and that to the extent the Jus-
tice Department's position has changed it has been in response to
these changes in the legal landscape. Second, it asserts that its
critics have distorted the Administration's record, in part because
of their differences with it over the extent of the rights possessed
by institutionalized persons and the degree to which it is appropri-
ate for the Federal government to impose its views on the states.
Third, it maintains that it is inappropriate to measure the Depart-
ment's activity by the number of lawsuits filed. The Department
argues that the passage of CRIPA demonstrated Congress's dissat-
isfaction with litigation on behalf of such persons and compels in-
creasing resort to negotiation and conciliation. Thus, in order to
demonstrate its commitment, the Department cites statistics on
the number of CRIPA investigations it has initiated since the be-
ginning of the Reagan Administration, and claims credit for
changes supposedly made in response to those investigations. Fi-
nally, the Department points to its involvement in the "Baby Jane
Doe" case 7 as further evidence of its activism on behalf of disabled
5. See, e.g., Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 146-52 (transcript of
television news report criticizing Justice Department); The Wash. Post, Sept.
29, 1982, at A2, col. 1; The Washington Council of Lawyers, Reagan Civil
Rights: The First Twenty Months, 80-102 (June, 1982).
6. See, e.g, Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 3-39 (Testimony and
Statement of William Bradford Reynolds); Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, Correcting the Record of Civil Rights Enforcement, Jan. 20,
1981 to Sept. 30, 1982: A Response to the Report of the Washington Council of
Lawyers 43-50 (Nov. 1982); Remarks of The Hon. William Bradford Reynolds,
Ass. Att'y. Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dept. Justice, Before the Am. Bar
Ass'n Comm'n on the Mentally Disabled (Nov. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Reynolds Statement].
7. United States v. University Hosp. of the State Univ. of N.Y., 729 F.2d 144 (2d
Cir. 1984), aff'g 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
[Vol. 63:680
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persons.
Who is right in all this, the Administration or its critics? In my
view, the rationales advanced in defense of the current Adminis-
tration's different approach to institutional reform litigation are
unpersuasive. Far from compelled, its interpretations of recent
cases are unduly narrow and, in some cases, plainly wrong. Its re-
versals of positions in landmark cases have been both symbolically
and practically devastating. The Administration's philosophy of
non-litigation is unfaithful to the spirit of CRIPA and the historical
and legislative record on which the statute was based. The Admin-
istration's focus on the number of investigations initiated as a
measure of its success belies the essential fact that there is little
pressure on those being investigated to cooperate with the Depart-
ment: in the four years since the passage of CRIPA the Reagan
Administration has not litigated any case, and ified only one under
the statute on behalf of institutionalized disabled people.
The Reagan Justice Department's positions on the rights of
handicapped persons, as in other civil rights areas,8 ultimately
defy both history and sound (and previously indisputable) concep-
tions of policy. Sadly, few people today would even think of sub-
scribing to a statement that seemed a truism when made by the
Senate Judiciary Committee in 1979: "The inescapable conclusion
is that in the foreseeable future, institutionalized individuals will
continue to depend on the U.S. Justice Department as the primary
enforcer of their consitutional and Federal statutory rights."' 9
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Justice Department's role in litigation on behalf of institu-
tionalized mentally disabled persons began in 1971 when United
States District Court Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. invited the in-
volvement of the United States as "litigating" amicus curiae-i0 in
8. See supra note 5 and sources cited. See also Days, Turning Back the Clock:
The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.I L. REv. 309
(1984) (criticizing Administration policies in employment discrimination,
school desegregation and voting rights).
9. S. Rep. No. 416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 n.54 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Senate Report].
10. The term "litigating" amicus curiae derives from the United States' participa-
tion as an amicus curiae with the rights of a party in racial discrimination
suits fied in the 1960's. See 0. Fiss, INJuNCTaoNs 618-19 (1972). In such cases,
and in mental disability litigation, the Department of Justice fully partici-
pated in the case, presenting and cross-examining witnesses, conducting dis-
covery, and so on. The role of the litigating amicus curiae is thus
considerably broader than that traditionally implied by the term amicus
curiae.
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the landmark case of Wyatt v. Stickney."1 In Wyatt, the court held
that Alabama's involuntarily committed mentally ill patients had a
constitutional due process right to receive minimally adequate
treatment,12 and that institutionalized mentally retarded persons
had a correlative right to receive minimally adequate habilita-
tion.13 Assisted by the Justice Department's and other amici's
presentation of expert testimony14 and the parties' stipulations,
the court issued detailed standards for treatment in Alabama's
mental hospitals and mental retardation institutions. 5 Conditions
in those institutions were horrifying,16 but unfortunately not
uniquely so. Subsequent to Wyatt, the Justice Department par-
ticpated in almost every major case in the mental disability field,
including broad-based attacks on conditions in New York's Willow-
brool,17 Pennsylvania's Pennhurst,18 and Nebraska's Beatrice
State Home.' 9
11. 325 F. Supp. 781, 786 (M.D. Ala. 1971). This initial reported decision in Wyatt
was followed by a number of others as the litigation progressed. Separate
decisions were issued covering the court's findings regarding the respective
rights of the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. See infra notes 12-16 and
accompanying text. In addition, in 1971 President Nixon issued a statement
on mental retardation in which he directed the Department of Justice to
"strengthen the assurance of full legal rights for the retarded." President'S
Statement on Mental Retardation, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1530 (Nov.
16, 1971).
12. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
13. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
14. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 375, n.3 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (listing amici
in mental illness action). See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 n.4
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (listing amici in mental retardation action).
15. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (treatment standards for
mental hospitals). See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (treatment standards for mental retardation institutions), a ffd in
relevant part, reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
16. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney 344 F. Supp. 391 n.7, 393-94 n.13 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(detailing conditions and abuse of residents).
17. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (while no constitutional right to treatment, institu-
tionalized citizens have right to reasonable protection from harm). See also
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (approving consent decree). See infra notes 23-25 and accom-
panying text.
18. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), affd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd and
remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), judgment reinstated on state law grounds, 673
F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 903 (1984).
19. Horacek v. Exon, No. 72-L-299 (D. Neb. Oct. 31, 1975). Horacek proved to be a
particularly difficult and frustrating example of protracted state opposition to
the involvement of the Justice Department in institutional rights litigation.
Officials from Nebraska were active and vocal opponents of CRIPA. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights of the Institutionalized: Hearings on S. 10 Before the Subcomm.
[Vol. 63:680
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The theories underlying the various right-to-treatment or right-
to-habilitation cases varied somewhat. Probably the most preva-
lent theory was that adopted by the court in Wyatt. There, the
court held that if persons were committed to state institutions for
the purpose of treatment (or habilitation), it would be a denial of
due process to fail to provide such treatment. This theory derived
from Jackson v. Indiana,20 where, in another context, the Supreme
Court determined that: "At the least, due process requires that the
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the person is committed."21 Advocates
argued that since the purpose of commitment, as defined in almost
all state statutes, was the provision of treatment or habilitation,
confinement of an individual without treatment would not bear a
"reasonable relationship" to the statutory purpose and would thus
violate due process. The cases in the mental disability field for the
most part did not focus on the quality of treatment provided, or on
the specific modalities used. Rather, they examined whether the
institution had sufficient numbers of trained staff, an adequate
physical and psychological environment, and plans for the provi-
sion of treatment such that institutional residents would have a
chance to receive minimally adequate treatment or habilitation.22
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96 Cong., 1st Sess.
236-43 (1979) (testimony of Senator J.J. Exon, Neb.) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Senate Hearings]; Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on S.
1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 572-80 (1977) (testimony of Mel Kammerlohr,
Asst. Att'y Gen. Neb. & prepared statement of Paul L Douglas, Att'y Gen.
Neb.) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Hearings]. But see Prepared State-
ment of the Neb. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 1979 Senate Hearings, supra, at
243-68 (detailed rebuttal of Exon testimony and history of state opposition to
express terms of Horacek Consent Decree & Agreement). A detailed history
of the Horacek case is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting,
however, that the district court eventually adopted a Plan of Implementation
developed by state officials, in the face of strong opposition by the Justice
Department. In an ironic twist, counsel for the original plaintiffs abandoned
their earlier positions and supported the state's plan, leaving the Justice De-
partment as the sole party advocating for the terms of the original Consent
Decree & Agreement. See generally Post-Hearing Brief of the United States,
Horacek v. Exon, No. 72-L-299 (D. Neb. Mar. 16, 1981). Horacek was one of the
last cases in which the Administration, albeit possibly more through transi-
tional neglect than conscious design, advocated vigorously the rights of insti-
tutional residents.
For a general discussion of the origins and early history of Horacek, see
Frohboese & Sales, Parental Opposition to Deinstitutionalization: A Chal-
lenge in Need of Attention and Resolution, 4 LAw & H. BEHAV. 1, 17-34 (1980).
20. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
21. Id. at 738.
22. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in
original).
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Another institutional reform theory was the right to protection
from harm articulated by Judge Orrin Judd in the Willowbrook liti-
gation.23 In its first conception, the right to protection from harm
appeared to be substantially narrower than the right to habilita-
tion recognized in Wyatt. However, by 1975, in an opinion approv-
ing a proposed consent decree in the case, Judge Judd wrote that
there was no bright line distinguishing the two theories, and that
the programmatic steps necessary to prevent the harm of regres-
sion - that is, loss of essential skills - were coextensive with
those required under a habilitation theory.24 The Willowbrook
case thus established the important principle that protection from
harm meant more than protection from physical abuse.25
Institutional litigation shifted by the late 1970's from the Wyatt
emphasis on detailed injunctive decrees mandating institutional
improvement to the Pennhurst approach of replacement of existing
state institutions totally or substantially with a network of commu-
nity-based settings. Actually, Wyatt included provisions for place-
ment of residents in community-based settings,26 and the
Pennhurst order included provisions for amelioration of some in-
stitutional conditions. 27 But the focus undeniably had changed.
The change in legal approach, spurred on by statutory enactments
such as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,28 the Education for
the Handicapped Act,29 and the Developmentally Disabled Assist-
ance and Bill of Rights Act,30 mirrored professional developments
in the fields of mental retardation and mental health. Thus, where
23. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
24. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 718-19
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
25. Another right-to-treatment or habilitation theory was the quid pro quo the-
ory, which held that treatment was the constitutionally required quid pro quo
for denying institutionalized persons their liberty without the full panoply of
due process protections available in the criminal justice context. See, e.g.,
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563
(1975). Relief was also sought under the eighth amendment theory that con-
finement without treatment or habilitation would amount to cruel and unu-
sual punishment. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (violation of equal protection). See Halpern, The Right
to Habiliation in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 385-406 (M.
Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod & T. Shaffer ed. 1976). See also Burt, Beyond the
Right to Habilitation, id at 418-36.
26. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Standard 3 (c)).
27. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1328-29
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 6001 (1982). See generally 1979 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 18
(listing statutes protecting institutionalized persons).
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mental health and mental retardation professionals talked about
normalization,3 ' lawyers translated this term into the legal re-
quirement that disabled people be provided treatment or habilita-
tion in the "least restrictive environment." Essentially,
recognition that disabled people had to receive services in the least
restrictive environment meant that such people could not be un-
necessarily placed or kept in institutions if the services they
needed could be adequately delivered in community-based set-
tings. The lower federal courts were virtually unanimous in up-
holding this concept.32
Several considerations are significant when one attempts to
place the Justice Department's role in these cases in perspective.
First, these cases were all originally brought by private plaintiffs,
with the Justice Department particpating as either a litigating ami-
cus curiae or plaintiff-intervenor. While the Department's role va-
ried from case to case, it -was frequently the only litigant with the
economic and other resources to do the extensive discovery neces-
sary to prove that the institution did not meet constitutional stan-
dards. Moreover, while private plaintiffs might be able to muster
the wherewithal to fie the case and prove liability, it was often the
Justice Department that was the only "plaintiff' able to monitor
defendants' compliance with the extensive court decrees. In addi-
tion, the early right-to-treatment and right-to-habilitation cases
were often somewhat volatile mixtures of adversarial and coopera-
tive approaches. Perhaps recognizing that conditions in the insti-
tutions were so inhumane as to be indefensible, defendants either
consented to the entering of relief in whole or in part, or admitted
that they shared plaintiffs' goals of institutional improvement or
closure, while wishing to be allowed to set their own timetable for
its accomplishment. Not infrequently, the lawyers for the states
would litigate these cases aggressively, even while defendant offi-
31. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1311
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (under principles of normalization, retarded individual is
treated as much like non-retarded persons as possible; normalization
stresses development of maximum potential in environment free of restric-
tive routines).
32. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cam-
eron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F.
Supp. 1209, 1225 (E.D. La. 1976); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1028
(ED. Pa. 1977); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 452 (S.D. Iowa 1976);
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974). Cf. O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (state cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous person who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
either alone or with help); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("even
though a governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial" it cannot be
attained by stifling means "when the end can be more narrowly achieved").
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
cials themselves were not at all averse to having a court order
them to make massive improvements in their facilities and/or
place numerous of the facilities' residents in non-institutional com-
munity-based settings. For, having been ordered to bring their fa-
cilities up to minimal consitutional standards, these officials could
then turn to their respective state legislatures and ask for badly
needed additional funding, while avoiding criticism by themselves
blaming the federal district judge. Those who litigated on behalf of
institutionalized persons thus learned to take state officials' pro-
tests against federal involvement with a large grain of salt.
Another important facet of institutional reform litigation was
the complexity involved when fashioning any meaningful relief for
the constitutional and statutory violations found. In many of the
cases courts appointed entities such as special masters, human
rights committees, expert panels, and receivers to assist defend-
ants in devising plans to achieve compliance.33 While these meas-
ures were criticized by some, they were often undertaken only
after defendants had demonstrated their inability or unwillingness
to make necessary changes in their institutions or even submit
plans to do so. Indeed, the ordering of injunctive relief in the first
instance often came only after years of litigation and decades of
official neglect, followed by belated and inadequate attempts to ad-
dress the serious problems identified.34
The Justice Department was intimately involved in this bur-
geoning area of law, not only participating in but helping to shape
the substantive developments that occurred. However, not want-
ing to be completely dependent on others to file lawsuits, and con-
cerned that the worst institutions might very well be those that no
one was in a position to challenge, the Department sought in sev-
33. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1326 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (special master); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (review panel); Wyatt
v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (human rights
committees).
34. For example, in Wyatt, Judge Johnson issued detailed standards only after
giving the defendants time to submit their own plan to improve conditions in
Alabama's facilities. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1344, 1344 n.3. (M.D.
Ala. 1971) (rejecting defendants' proposed standards); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (90 days to prepare and fie plan). The
later appointment of a receiver, see infra text accompanying note 75, oc-
curred only after finding substantial non-compliance with the court's orders
seven years after their entry. Indeed, defendants conceded their non-compli-
ance with the mental health orders. Wyatt v. Ireland, C.A. No. 3195-N, memo-
randum opinion at 2 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 1979). In Halderman, Judge
Broderick appointed a special master only after the defendants failed to sub-
mit an adequate plan to address the unconstitutional conditions found at
Pennhurst. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1325-26 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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eral cases to initiate its own litigation. Arguing that it possessed
the inherent authority to sue to redress constitutional violations
committed against its citizens, the Justice Department filed suit
against officials responsible for the operation of two mental retar-
dation institutions, Rosewood State Hospita35 and Boulder River
State Hospital.36 The district courts in these cases, however, re-
jected the Department's theory, and these decisions were affirmed
on appeal. Not only did the Solomon and Mattson decisions under-
cut the Department's efforts to initiate litigation, but defendants in
existing cases in which the United States was a plaintiff-intervenor
regularly fied motions to dismiss based on Solomon and Mattson,
asserting that if the government did not have the authority to sue
on its own it did not have the authority to intervene. Most courts
rejected these arguments, but even when they did so the Depart-
ment was required to spend much time and effort litigating its au-
thority to sue. If nothing else, these tactics bought defendants
time to make at least surface improvements in their facilities.
To remedy the uncertainty of its litigating status, the Justice
Department sought passage of a "standing" statute that would al-
low it to bring on its own the very kinds of cases it had participated
in as amicus curiae and plaintiff-intervenor. From 1977 to 1979,
Congress held extensive hearings on what would become CRIPA.37
It heard about the appalling conditions in this country's institu-
tions. It heard also of the Justice Department's extensive role in
the litigation designed to ameliorate those conditions. Advocates
for disabled individuals testified that they were not in a position to
bring that litigation on the needed scale without the presence of
the Department.38 Critics of the proposed statute were current or
former state officials who railed against what they regarded as the
Department's heavy-handed investigatory and litigation activi-
ties.39 Some urged, no doubt disingenuously, that the statute was
35. United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), affid, 563 F.2d 1121
(4th Cir. 1977).
36. United States v. Mattson, CA. No. 74-138-BU (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1976), a ffd,
600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. See generally 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 19; Civil Rights of Institution-
alized Persons: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 19; Civil
Rights for Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
38. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 179, 182 (testimony of Charles R. Hal-
pern, Director Council for Pub. Interest Law & Member, A.B.A. Comm'n on
the Mentally Disabled).
39. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings supra note 19, at 556-69 (testimony of Francis
B. Burch, Att'y Gen. Md.); id. at 572-80 (testimony of Mel Kammerlohr, Asst.
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unnecessary because the Justice Department was already able to
intervene in cases.4o
But in passing CRIPA, the majority of Congress determined
that the statute was necessary. Senator Birch Bayh, prime Senate
sponsor of the Institutionalized Persons bill, stressed that it was a
bill designed to protect the constitutional rights of the country's
most vulnerable citizens.4 1 The Senate Judiciary Committee
praised the Department's role in institutional litigation.42 It noted
that while conditions had begun to improve in some state institu-
tions, defendants would have little incentive to continue their im-
provements without a "real threat of litigation."43 It further
observed that because of their disabilities, isolation, poverty and
fear of retaliation, institutional residents themselves were unable
to bring lawsuits in their own behalf.44 Nor did public interest cen-
ters and legal aid programs have the resoures, manpower, or con-
tinuity to litigate a case as fully and extensively as necessary.4 5
The Committee determined that it was appropriate for the Justice
Department to be given statutory authority to sue because of its
financial resources, its knowledge about experts in the field, its
complement of highly skilled attorneys, its selectivity in case se-
lection, and its stability and continuity.46 The authority conferred
on the Justice Department by the proposed statute paralleled ex-
isting authority in other civil rights statutes.47
CRIPA faced little opposition in the House, but was opposed
strongly on the Senator floor by several conservative senators.
These opponents attacked the Justice Department's role in ex-
isting cases, criticized the statute's resort to litigation to deal with
institutional problems, and argued that the proposed statute
trenched upon state's rights.48 Proponents responded by noting
that the statute's emphasis on pre-suit negotiation and consulta-
tion satisfied legitimate federalism concerns and provided a basis
Att'y Gen. Neb.); id. at 605-14 (testimony of C. Raymond Marvin, Counsel
Nat'l Ass'n Att'y Gen.). See also 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 270-
94 (testimony of Thomas Rath, Att'y Gen. N.H.); id. at 372-81 (testimony of
Otto P. Estes on behalf of Nat'l Ass'n State Mental Retardation
Coordinators).
40. 1979 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 44 (Minority Views of Sens. Thurmond,
Laxalt, Cochran & Simpson).
41. 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 1-2.
42. 1979 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 1-2 & 13-15.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id. at 19-21.
45. Id. at 21.
46. Id. at 22-24.
47. Id. at 28-29 (citing various civil rights statutes).
48. 126 Cong. Rec. 3717-18 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 3726-28 (re-
marks of Sen. Morgan).
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for the states to avoid extensive litigation, where appropriate.
Moreover, they argued further that where conditions were espe-
cially egregious, and where the state or local response was inade-
quate, litigation would be necessary to vindicate the rights of
institutionalized persons. 4 9 Litigation was not a panacea, but in
the words of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
Experience has shown, however, that [litigation] is also the single most
effective method for redressing systematic deprivations of institutional-
ized persons' constitutional and Federal statutory rights. Until such time
as every State and political subdivision assumes full responsibility for
protecting the fundamental rights of its institutionalized citizens, the need
for Federal enforcement of those rights will continue.5 0
In CRIPA,51 Congress gave the Justice Department authority to
sue when a pattern or practice of "egregious or flagrant" conditions
were found to exist in a state or local institution.5 2 The statute pro-
vided the Department with authority both to initiate and intervene
in pending cases. Congress also required the Attorney General to
certify prior to filing suit that he had notified the appropriate state
or local officials at least seven days in advance of his intent to com-
mence an investigation, and that at least forty-nine days prior to
filing suit he had advised these officials of: the alleged unconstitu-
tional and illegal conditions existing at the institutions; the sup-
porting facts; and the minimum measures which, if taken, would
remedy those conditions. 53
CRIPA's requirements that institutional conditions be egre-
gious and flagrant and that the Attorney General certify that he
has notified and consulted with state and local officials prior to fil-
ing suit are in addition to those required in traditional institutional
litigation brought by private plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
But an examination of CRIPA's legislative history shows that the
"egregious and flagrant" language was meant to describe the kinds
of conditions uncovered in the Department's previous litigation.54
And whether the notification language is viewed as a necessary
legislative compromise, a response to legitimate concerns of state
officials supposedly "surprised" by the existence of flagrantly un-
constitutional conditions in their institutions, or an expression of
Congress's concern over issues of federalism and conity,55 it nev-
ertheless is plain that such language was not the raison d'etre of
the statute but merely a procedural limitation on the Department's
49. Id. at 3718-21 (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
50. 1979 Senate Report, supra note 9, at 27.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1982).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (1982).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b (1982).
54. 126 Cong. Rec. 3713 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
55. Id.
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ability to sue. Properly applied, those requirements should have
added little to the Department's previously-derived procedures for
entrance into litigation. Opponents of the statute made dire pre-
dictions that if the statute were enacted the Justice Department
would run roughshod over the states and file numerous lawsuits.
Few people - opponents or proponents - would have thought
that four years after passage of CRIPA the Department would not
be litigating any cases on behalf of institutionalized disabled
persons.
I. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S ACTIVITIES UNDER
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
The Reagan Administration's record of enforcing the rights of
institutionalized disabled persons has been retrogressive and its
policies misdirected. Yet unlike the Administration's highly publi-
cized reversals in civil rights areas such as employment discrimi-
nation, racial discrimination in education and housing, and aid to
racially discriminatory schools, the changes in the area of institu-
tional reform litigation were, at first, more subtle, slower in com-
ing, and less clearly defined. In recent months, even as publicity
over the Justice Department's policies in this area has increased,
the debate between the Administration and its critics has shed
more heat than light. To some extent, perhaps inevitably, the con-
troversy has focused more on personalities than policies. But an
examination of those policies leaves no doubt that the current ad-
ministration has retreated from both its Republican and Demo-
cratic predecessors' commitment to vindicating the rights of
disabled persons.
One of the earliest indications of the Justice Department's new
philosophy came not in a pending case or investigation but in its
interpretation of a Supreme Court case, Youngberg v. Romeo.56 In
Youngberg, the Court, for the first time, held that involuntarily-
committed mentally retarded persons had a substantive due pro-
cess right to safety, freedom from bodily restraint, and such mini-
mally adequate training as necessary to effectuate these rights.
The Court also noted that defendants had conceded that institu-
tionalized residents had a right to receive adequate food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care. The Court did not decide whether such
residents had a broad right to habilitation per se, concluding that
the plaintiff did not pursue such a right and that a decision on the
issue was thus unnecessary.57 The Court also interpreted the rec-
ord and plaintiff's counsel's oral argument to concede that plaintiff
56. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
57. Id. at 318 n.23.
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was not seeking release from the institution, and "that no amount
of training will make possible his release."58 Thus, the Court had
no occasion to consider whether institutionalized persons had a
right to receive the training necessary to effectuate their release.
In attempting to provide guidance to lower courts, Justice Powell,
for the majority, noted that
A court may properly start with the generalization that there is a right to
minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in
terms more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is rea-
sonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the
casa59
Since, according to the Court, Nicholas Romeo was claiming only
the limited liberty interests of safety and freedom from undue re-
straint, the nature of the training sought in his case was deemed to
be relatively limited.
The Court went on to balance the institutionalized person's lib-
erty interests against the state's interests in operating the institu-
tion. It determined that courts should defer presumptively to the
judgments of institutional professionals regarding the appropriate
course of treatment. If the institution's professionals in fact exer-
cised professional judgment, the plaintiffs due process interests
would be satisfied.60 Thus, in keeping with decisions in the prison
and procedural due process fields,61 the Court provided recogni-
tion of a right and at the same time suggested limitation on its ex-
ercise by adopting a narrow standard of judicial review.
In his concurring opinon, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Brennan, suggested at least two areas in which he
might have recognized a broader right to habilitation had the issue
been clearly in the case. He noted that under the Jackson due pro-
cess theory, it would have been a serious question whether a state
could commit an individual for the purpose of treatment and then
58. Id. at 317. There is some question about whether the Court properly charac-
terized respondent's concession that Romeo's release was impossible. In the
oral argument, counsel was asked whether he was arguing that his client was
constitutionally entitled to release; he replied that his client could not care
for himself by himself or with the help of friends, an obvious reference to the
standard advanced in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). Tr. of
Oral Arg. at 35, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Counsel's conces-
sion that he was not challenging the state's commitment power, id., is not
equivalent to conceding that his client was too disabled to be released. In
any event, Nicholas Romeo is now out of Pennhurst, living in a community-
based program. Brief of PARC at 9n.*, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
and Hosp., Nos. 78-1490, 78-1564, 78-1602 (3d Cir., pending after remand from
Supreme Court).
59. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 n.25 (1982) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 321-23.
61. See id. at 322 n.29.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
fail to provide it.62 Second, he wrote that he would seriously listen
to the argument that a state's failure to preserve "those basic self
care skills necessary to [a resident's] personal autonomy" 63 would
entail an unconstitutional denial of the resident's liberty, irrespec-
tive of the effect of such lack of training on the resident's safety
and mobility. Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority, how-
ever, that the plaintiff in Youngberg did not raise these issues
clearly. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment, would
have held that institutionalized persons had no right to habilita-
tion per se;6 4 he dismissed as "frivolous" the Jackson argument
that a state statute could create rights entitled to substantive pro-
tection under the Due Process Clause.65 In light of his opinion in
O'Connor v. Donaldson,66 the Chief Justice's opposition to a right
to habilitation or treatment was not surprising.
Youngberg then was one of those decisions that provided some-
thing for everyone. Advocates for disabled people hailed it for its
recognition of institutionalized persons' substantive due process
rights. State administrators and institutional professionals
cheered the Court's language regarding deference to professional
judgment. The Court, for its part, seemingly went out of its way to
issue as narrow a decision as possible, and virtually invited the
lower courts and litigators to engage in a dialogue over how the
balance of liberty and state interests would be struck in particular
cases. It was, accordingly, reasonable to assume that the Justice
Department would be part of that dialogue.
Youngberg was decided on June 18, 1982. Just six days later,
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General of the
Civil Rights Division, and the Administration official with primary
responsibility for enforcing the rights of institutionalized disabled
persons, issued a memorandum to his staff intepreting Youngberg
and its effect on the Justice Department's litigation program.67 He
determined that henceforth the Department would seek enforce-
ment of only those rights explicitly recognized in Youngberg, that
is, food, clothing, shelter and medical care, reasonably safe condi-
tions, freedom from undue bodily restraint, and training necessary
to provided safety and freedom from undue restraint. No longer
would the Department pursue matters such as adequacy of psychi-
atric or psychological care. Implicitly, the memorandum rejected
62. Id. at 325-27 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a brief examination of the Jack-
son theory, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
63. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 328 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 329 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 330 n.*.
66. 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
67. See The Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1982, at A2, col. 1 (noting the June 24, 1982 memo
and the subsequent controversy).
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the position of the Blackmun concurrence in Youngberg. For the
Justice Department, the dialogue seemingly promised by
Youngberg was over before the first word was spoken.
The Reagan Administration has read Youngberg as the limiting
case rather than as the first step in an ongoing process of develop-
ing legal standards for the rights of institutionalized persons. It
has ignored the post-Youngberg lower-court decisions that have at-
tempted to flesh out the case's meaning and interpret it in a mod-
erately expansive manner.68 In particular, it has shown its
insensitivity to existing conditions in state institutions by refusing
to consider issues such as lack of habilitation programs, failure to
train residents in self-care skills, and enforced resident idleness as
subsumed withint Youngberg's recognition of a right to training. It
has failed to heed Judge Judd's insight in Willowbrook that "harm"
is more than physical harm.
Moreover, while Mr. Reynolds has recently suggested that the
Department now reads Youngberg more expansively than it did at
first,69 the record reflects continued rigid adherence to the most
parsimonious interpretation of the decision. In letters written to
state officials, pursuant to Section 4 of CRIPA,70 the Justice De-
partment has felt compelled to emphasize its narrow reading of
Youngberg.71 In the only mental disability case that the Justice
Department has actually initiated under CRIPA, United States v.
State of Indiana,72 the settlement agreement jointly proposed by
the Department and the state lists as general principles only those
rights recognized explicitly by Youngberg. Even the more specific
relief is limited by references to only the narrowest Youngberg
rights. In fact, the settlement does not discuss a right to training at
68. See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 485-89
(D.N.D. 1982) (due process requirement of minimally adequate training en-
compasses self-care skills as expressed by Justice Blackmun in Youngberg),
affid, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children
v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1341-49 (E.D. N.Y. 1983) ("training in basic self-
care skills [should] be provided as a constitutional right") affd in part, rev'd
in par remanded in par Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, Nos. 83-7621 & 83-7663, slip op. at 4,368-70 (2d Cir. June 13, 1984)
(adopting Justice Blackmun concurrence on preservation of self-care skills
despite repeating least restrictive alternative analysis). See also, Cook, The
Substantive Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Citizens, 7 MENT. Dis. L.
REP. 346 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 77, 82-85
(1982) (reasoning that the "majority's liberty based rationale suggests that
mental patients have a constitutional right to rehabilitation rather than
merely protective treatment").
69. See Reynolds Statement, supra note 6, at 6-7.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b (1982).
71. See Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 74, 80-82 (letters from the
Justice Department).
72. C.A. No. IP 84 411C (S.D. Ind. Apr. 6, 1984).
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all, but rather "daily medical and custodial care sufficient to guar-
antee" safety and freedom from restraint.73
Reading Youngberg narrowly has had another effect as well.
State and local officials now know that the Justice Department's
"bottom-line" is Youngberg. There is thus little incentive for them
to improve institutional conditions beyond those mandated by
Youngberg, narrowly applied. Given the intrinsic flexibility in
concepts such as a safe environment, lack of restraint, and train-
ing, the Department's Youngberg interpretation inevitably stifles
state experimentation and denies the heuristic value of the De-
partment's positions.
The Administration's embrace of Youngberg has not been re-
stricted to its CRIPA investigations. It has also improperly used
Youngberg as an excuse to alter its long-standing positions in
landmark cases. The clearest example of the Department's rever-
sal of position has been in the Wyatt case, now styled Wyatt v. Ire-
land.7 4 Over the years, defendants had made some progress in
complying with the court's 1972 orders, but by 1979 the lack of com-
pliance was so severe that Judge Johnson placed the state's De-
partment of Mental Health in receivership, naming Governor Fob
James as receiver.75 Subsequently, plaintiffs continued to chal-
lenge defendants' compliance with the court orders and the plan of
compliance they had submitted. They filed motions to require the
provision of additional funding to the state's Department of Mental
Health and to replace the Governor with a new receiver. Defend-
ants countered with motions to terminate the receivership entirely
and to modify the court's injunctive orders. Plaintiffs and defend-
ants engaged in extensive discovery on compliance. The Justice
Department essentially took no position on these matters, al-
though it participated in the compliance discovery during the
spring and summer of 1982.
During the mid-1982, while the above activities were occurring,
Justice Department officials met a number of times with defendant
officials and their lawyers, but not with plaintiffs, in an effort to
"settle" the case. These negotiations culminated in a proposed
"settlement decree," submitted to the court in late 1982.76 In this
document, the Justice Department agreed with defendants' propo-
sal to modify the existing court orders by replacing them with
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) standards
and accreditation procedures for Alabama's mental health institu-
73. Id., Settlement Agreement at 6-7.
74. C.A. No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala.).
75. Id., Orders of Oct. 25, 1979 & Jan. 15, 1980.
76. See Wyatt v. Ireland, C.A. No. 3195-N at 8 n.3 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 1983).
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tions and medicaid77 standards and certification procedures for its
mental retardation facilities. Significantly, the joint proposal
would not merely substitute one set of professional standards for
another, but rather would transfer the determination of compli-
ance with the court's orders from the court itself to non-party
JCAH officials and state medicaid surveyors. Achievement of ac-
creditation or certification would "raise a strong but not irrebut-
table presumption that the residents within these facilities are
receiving constitutionally adequate care and treatment."78 The
standard for constitutional care and treatment would be the nar-
row Youngberg one. Furthermore, as of the date of the proposal,
defendants were not in compliance with JCAH standards at their
principal mental health facilities, and did not expect to be so for
several years. Until compliance was achieved, defendants' facili-
ties would essentially be subject to no standards at all, except that
conditions could not deteriorate below their then-existing level, a
level that plaintiffs' and the Justice Department's evidence showed
to be below compliance with the court's orders. Finally, the agree-
ment provided for the termination of court jurisdiction over the
mental retardation facilities within one year, and over the mental
health facilities within three years of initial JCAH accreditation.
Plaintiffs opposed the settlement proposal and the court currently
has taken it under advisement as the defendants' and Justice De-
partment's joint proposal for relief.
I have dwelt on the Wyatt case at some length for a number of
reasons. From 1978-1979 I was a trial attorney, and from 1979-1982
lead trial attorney for the Justice Department on the case, and am
thus intimately familiar with the Department's positions and activ-
ities in it. More importantly, as noted,7 9 Wyatt is the landmark
right-to-treatment and habilitation case, and was the first case in
which the Justice Department appeared as an advocate for the
rights of institutionalized persons. Wyatt figured prominently in
77. Title XIX of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
78. Wyatt v. Ireland, C.A. No. 3195-N, Proposed Settlement Agreement at 3 (M.D.
Ala. 1983). Cf. Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 1984) (JCAH compli-
ance merely prima facie evidence of adequacy). In a recent statement sub-
mitted to two Senate Subcommittees, Secretary of Health and Human
Services Margaret M. Heckler reported that a federal "look behind" survey of
mental retardation institutions certified by states to be meeting medicaid
standards revealed that the facilities had "a range of problems in a number of
basic areas, including the provision of active treatment, the monitoring of
drugs, and the provision of a safe and sanitary environment." Statement by
Margaret M. Heckler, Sec'y of Health and Human Services, Before the Sub-
comm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
sources and the Subcomm. on Labor/HHS/Education of the Senate Comm.
on Appropriations (July 31, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Heckler Statement].
79. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
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Congress's consideration of CRIPA. The Department's reversal of
position is, therefore, symbolically significant, both for the field of
institutional reform litigation and for the Department itself. Sub-
stantively, the Department's recent actions show the extent to
which it is willing to apply Youngberg unthinkingly and to ignore
clear evidence of non-compliance with court orders. Essentially,
the Department agreed to reward defendants for their non-compli-
ance with court orders entered ten years previously. The case also
reveals the Department's almost visceral reaction against the ne-
cessity for the extensive relief historically found to be necessary in
institutional litigation. The proposed agreement appears to be
nothing so much as a "quick fix" to resolve complex issues. It fur-
ther shows the Department's willingness to modify existing court
orders based on virtually no showing at all.8 0 Finally, the Depart-
ment's recent role in case shows its increasing sensitivity to polit-
ical concerns.8 1
If Wyatt were the only example of the Reagan Justice Depart-
ment's lack of commitment to the rights of institutionalized dis-
abled persons it might be dismissed as an aberration.
Unfortunately, the Department has changed its position in other
cases as well. It has refused to support relief even where agreed to
by defendants,82 and in one case supported a proposed consent de-
cree agreed to by defendants only because it determined it would
be "unseemly" to oppose it.83 It has resolutely refused to support
any form of expert panel or special master in institutional disabil-
ity litigation.8 4 In a juvenile right-to-treatment case, the Depart-
ment, prior to Youngberg, filed an extensive post-trial brief arguing
strenously for a right to treatment based on Jackson, only to re-
verse itself on appeal, finding that the institutionalized juveniles,
many of whom were mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed,
were not even entitled to Youngberg rights.85 Recently, in the
80. A willingness, it should be noted, that is at odds with established judicial
doctrines. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (modifica-
tion of decree requires "clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions"). Cf. New York Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Ca-
rey, 706 F.2d 956, 965-972 (2d Cir. 1983) (need for flexibility in institutional
reform decrees makes modification on behalf of defendants appropriate, but
only where proposed modification is in furtherance of purposes of decree).
81. See The Ala. J., Nov. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 5 (charge by one of plaintiffs attorneys
that agreement between Justice Department and state was "political deal").
82. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, CA. No. 74-2412 "C" (E.D. La.), discussed in
ACLU Report, supra note 1, at 3.
83. Connecticut Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. Thorne, discussed in Senate En-
forcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 119. See also id. at 201-02.
84. See Brief for the United States at 31-32, Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 903 (1984).
85. Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), affd in part, vacated and
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Eleventh Circuit, the Administration changed its position in a case
concerning the rights of handicapped school children under Sec-
tion 504.86 In the related area of promulgating Section 504 regula-
tions for federal programs, the Department's proposed regulations
have been attached as well.8 7
But most troubling of all was the brief the Justice Department
recently filed in the latest remand of Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School and Hospital.88 After the Supreme Court reversed 89 on
Eleventh Amendment grounds the Third Circuit's decision up-
holding most of the district court's injunctive relief on the basis of
state law, the issue on remand was whether there remained any
federal constitutional or statutory basis to support the trial court's
judgment. In its brief,90 the Department withdrew its ten-year
support for the plaintiffs' position and argued for reversal of the
district court judgment. Once again, it hewed closely to the nar-
rowly drawn Youngberg line, but this time with a new twist-the
Department explicitly adopted the Chief Justice's "concurrence"
in Youngberg: "Largely for the reasons articulated by Chief Jus-
tice Burger in his concurring opinion in Romeo (457 U.S. at 329-
331), we believe that involuntarily committed mental health [sic]
patients have no substantive constitutional right to habilitation be-
yond the limited right to training recognized in Romeo ".91
remanded in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2352
(1984).
86. Georgia Assoc. of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1580 n.15 (11th
Cir. 1983) ("The United States, invited to file a brief as amicus curiae has
blown hot, cold and hot as to the coverage under Section 504.") See generally
Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 163 n.16 (statement of Timothy
M. Cook).
87. See Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 127, 164 & 164 n.17; ACLU
Report, supra note 1, at 20 & 26. See also 48 Fed. Reg. 55,996, 56,003 (1983), 49
Fed. Reg. 7792-93 (1984). The Administration also ran into a firestorm of criti-
cism when it attempted to propose amendments to regulations promulgated
under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401
(1982), and subsequently was forced to withdraw its proposals. See 47 Fed.
Reg. 33,836 (1982) (notice of proposed rule-making); 47 Fed. Reg. 49,871 (1982)
(withdrawing proposals).
88. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affid in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d
Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981),judgment reinstated on state
law grounds, 673 F.2d 647 (3d. Cir. 1982) (en bane), rev'd and remanded, 104
S.Ct. 903 (1984). Subsequent to the filing of briefs and oral argument, the
parties agreed to a proposed settlement of the case. See proposed Final Set-
tlement Agreement, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., No. 74-
1345 (E.D. Pa.) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Settlement Agreement].
89. 104 S. Ct. 903 (1984).
90. Fourth Brief for the United States, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and
Hosp., Nos. 78-1490, 78-1564 & 78-1602 (3d Cir., pending after remand from
Supreme Court).
91. Id. at 7-8.
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The Department's Pennhurst brief thus demonstrates conclu-
sively that the Reagan Administration is committed to an unwar-
rantedly narrow interpretation of Youngberg. The brief went on to
argue that plaintiffs had no right to community placement, quoting
selectively to support its position;92 rejected (and showed it misun-
derstood) the Jackson treatment theory by adopting the Chief Jus-
tice's characterization of it,93 and rejected use of Section 504 as a
basis for creation of community-based services by extending
Southeastern Community College v. Davis9 4 well beyond its con-
text.9 5 As in Wyatt, the Department's role in Pennhurst had been
transformed from enforcer of rights of institutionalized disabled
people to their vigorous opponent.
These reversals of position have not only been problematic in
the specific cases, but have undermined one of the primary
sources of the Justice Department's previous strength in the field:
the continuity it was able to bring to the often lengthy litigation
and compliance processes. Continuity has further suffered in that
the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division has ex-
perienced 100 percent personnel turnover in the last one and one-
half years, turnover not unrelated to the Department's new poli-
cies. The Department's eagerness to change long-standing posi-
tions suggests a politicization of the litigation and enforcement
processes that inevitably makes it a less credible participant in
them. Its interpretation of Youngberg and its willingness to use it
as a prism through which all matters arising in institutional litiga-
tion are viewed forces it into the ignoble position of rejecting all
previous knowledge in the field and turning a deaf ear to new and
important developments. Thus, the Jackson treatment theory is
92. Compare id at 9 n.3 (citing New York Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey,
706 F.2d 956, 971 n.19 (2d Cir. 1983), for the proposition that "placement in
small community facilities is not appropriate for all mentally retarded per-
sons") with New York Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 971
n.19 (2d Cir. 1983) ("In this connection we note that defendants are by no
means alone in contending that placement in small community facilities is
not appropriate for all mentally retarded persons.") (emphasis added). The
Department, however, has signed the Pennhurst Proposed Settlement Agree-
ment, see supra note 88, which calls for closure of Pennhurst by July 1, 1986,
and placement of residents in community living arrangements.
93. Fourth Brief for the United States at 12, Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School and Hosp., Nos. 78-1490, 78-1564 & 78-1602 (3d Cir., pending after re-
mand from Supreme Court).
94. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
95. Fourth Brief for United States at 15-16 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
and Hosp., Nos. 78-1490, 78-1564 & 78-1602 (3d Cir., pending after remand from
Supreme Court). Cf. Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 649-53 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Davis does not preclude relief under Section 504 where plaintiffs are other-
wise qualified for a program and do not seek fundamental changes in its
nature).
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not viable, special masters are never appropriate, harm does not
include regression, and community placement can never be consti-
tutionally required, all because Youngberg did not explicitly sanc-
tion them. But, of course, these issues did not arise in Youngberg.
The irony with respect to community placement is that the Depart-
ment's retreat from the "least restrictive alternative" principle
comes at a time when, through their policies and statutes, states
are increasingly seeking to place institutionalized residents in
community-based facilities pursuant to that principle. 96 Even
96. The Department's reading of Youngberg as rejecting the least restrictive al-
ternative principle finds support in some of the recent Youngberg lower-court
cases, even though the Court clearly did not decide in Youngberg whether
institutionalized residents had a right to placement in the least restrictive
setting. See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, Nos.
83-7621 & 83-7663, slip op. at 4,361-66 (2d Cir. June 13, 1984) (no federal consti-
tutional entitlement to least restrictive alternative). The Second Circuit's de-
cision reversed in relevant part and remanded the district court's finding that
Youngberg does not necessarily preclude a least restrictive alternative analy-
sis in a case in which the court found that it need not reach that abstract right
because testimony and state law implied the desirability of community place-
ment. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp.
1300, 1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Compare Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir.
1983) (Opinion of Garth, Aldisert & Hunter, J.J.) (Youngberg's failure to refer
to "least inclusive means" analysis prevents court from using such analysis
in instant case) and id. at 271 (opinion of Adams, J., concurring in the result)
(Supreme Court rejected least instrusive means test) with id. at 274 (Weiss,
J., dissenting) (Youngberg Court found least intrusive standard not relevant
to case, but opinion does not purport to reject it). Other recent cases add to
the confusion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1208-10 (7th Cir. 1983)
(due process does not include "the right to be treated in the least restrictive
environment that money can buy," but does subsume state institution's fail-
ure to allow residents sufficient freedom of movement in institution and on
grounds); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 486
(D.N.D. 1982) (though Youngberg does not specifically address right to place-
ment in least restrictive alternative, Court's analysis implies rejection of ab-
solute right; nevertheless, right to least restrictive method of treatment exists
"insofar as professional judgment determines that such alternatives would
measurably enhance the resident's enjoyment of basic liberty interests"),
aFd on other grounds, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
A full discussion of the least restrictive alternative principle, and an at-
tempt to unsort the confusion that Youngberg has spawned, is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, there appear to be several approaches or
theories under which community placement and the least restrictive alterna-
tive principle could survive Youngberg. For example, insofar as the profes-
sional judgments of institutional staff identify specific institutional residents'
needs for community placement, the institution's failure to act on such exer-
cises of professional judgment could be a violation of Youngberg. Second, to
the extent state statutes define the purpose of institutional commitment as
care or treatment in the least restrictive setting, a state's failure to transfer a
resident to a less restrictive community-based setting would not accord with
due process requirements under the Jackson theory, see supra notes 20-22
and accompanying text, that the nature and duration of commitment bear a
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those cases that have questioned some aspects of the principle and
its applicability have not gone so far as to remove community
placement from the roster of permissible remedies for unconstitu-
tional institutional conditions as the Reagan Administration seems
to have done.9 7 That numerous lower court cases have recognized
the least restrictive alternative principle appears not to matter to
Department officials. Unless and until the Supreme Court adopts
it, other legal authority is of no moment.98 Inevitably, one must
conclude that the Department of Justice chooses to define and en-
force rights selectively unless, as with a definitive Supreme Court
decision, it has no choice but to enforce them.
Most of the debate concerning the role of the Reagan Justice
reasonable relation to the state's statutorily articulated purpose. Third,
Youngberg does not purport to overrule O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975), where, as noted, see supra note 32, the Court held that a state could
not confine without more a non-dangerous individual capable of surviving
safely in freedom either alone or with the help of family or friends. At least
for high-functioning mentally retarded and mentally ill individuals, place-
ment in a community-based setting with some staff supervision might be
analogized to survival with the help of family or friends, such that continued
unnecessary confinement of such individuals would violate due process.
The murky state of the law on the least restrictive principle requires those
advocating for the rights of institutionalized mentally disabled persons to
conceptualize rights carefully, identify likely interests precisely, and develop
factual records that demonstrate failure to exercise professional judgment, or
to follow it where exercised. Prior to the advent of the Reagan Administra-
tion, the Justice Department had the resources, expertise, and will necessary
for such analyses. Regretably, the Department's new attitude contributes to
the likelihood that those analyses will not be forthcoming.
97. See, e.g., the Nov. 19, 1981 order of the court in Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp.
171, 239 (D.N.H. 1981), cited in Post-Trial Memorandum of the United States
at 18 n.70, New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 551 F. Supp.
1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), in which the court rejected least restrictive alternative
principle, but mandated community placement of 235 institutional residents.
But cf. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, Nos. 83-7621 &
83-7663 (2d Cir. June 13, 1984 ) (reversing district court order requiring place-
ment of 400 institutional residents, though implying that community place-
ment order might be appropriate as remedy for unconstitutional institutional
conditions after state officials had opportunity to remediate conditions). The
1982 Willowbrook compliance proceeding, New York State Assoc. for Re-
tarded Children v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. N.Y. 1982), affid in part, rev'd
in part and remanded, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983), represents one of the only
recent instances where the Justice Department stood with plaintiffs to sup-
port community placement relief (mandated by the consent decree in that
case). The Department cites Willowbrook as one example of its commitment
to disabled persons. See Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 (tes-
timony of William Bradford Reynolds).
98. Cf. N. Y. Times, May 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (Social Security Administration offi-
cials practice policy of "non-acquiescence" in lower court decisions mandat-
ing payment of disability benefits, obeying only Supreme Court decisions as
precedents).
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Department has focused not on what the Department has done but
on what it has not done, specifically on what it has not done under
CRIPA. Quite simply, the Department has refused to exercise the
authority conferred by Congress. It has not actively litigated any
mental disability case under CRIPA, and has initiated only one
case, United States v. State of Indiana.99 The Reagan Administra-
tion has not intervened in any mental disability case under CRIPA.
In fact, it rejected staff attorneys' recommendations to intervene in
two cases. In one, Administration officials apparently determined
that conditions in the institution were so atrocious that involve-
ment of the Department was unnecessary.OO In the other, the De-
partment rejected a proposed intervention in a case brought
against the St. Louis State School and Hospital.101 In addition to
seeking remediation of deleterious institutional conditions, plain-
tiffs argued that Missouri's placement of class members in commu-
nity-based settings was unconstitutional because such settings
were "inherently unable to provide" adequate habilitative serv-
ices.102 Mr. Reynolds rejected the proposed intervention because
of the presence of competent counsel for plaintiffs and because he
determined that the Department should not choose sides in a dis-
pute between those advocating two different forms of relief - in-
stitutional improvement versus community placement - to
remedy unconstitutional conditions.l0 3 But the reasoning miscon-
strued plaintiffs' argument that community placement was inher-
ently unconstitutional. Given the Department's view that the
state should have the primary say in determining the appropriate-
ness of relief, the St. Louis case would have represented a golden
opportunity to assert the legitimacy of the state's choice. The fail-
ure to intervene in the St. Louis case raises the Administration's
antipathy to community placement to a new level.
The Administration's response to attacks on its lack of litigation
activity is to call attention to the number of investigations it has
initiated, and to stress that CRIPA favors a voluntary, non-adver-
sarial approach to the amelioration of institutional problems. 104
99. CA. No. IP 84 411C (S.D. Ind. Apr. 6, 1984) (consent decree).
100. See Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 117 (Cook Resignation
Memorandum; Grafton State School, the subject of Association for Retarded
Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), affid, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.
1983)).
101. Parents Ass'n of the St. Louis State School and Hosp. v. Bond, CA. No. 82-
0852-C(3) (E.D. Mo. filed May 28, 1982).
102. Id. Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and Other Relief, at 25 1
76 (emphasis added).
103. See Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 106 (memorandum from
William Bradford Reynolds to J. Harvie Wilkinson I1).
104. Id. at 5-6 (testimony of William Bradford Reynolds).
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The Administration and its critics have bandied figures about on
the number of investigations actually initiated under the Reagan
Administration. Taking the latest Administration figures as accu-
rate,105 the Administration has eighteen pending mental disability
investigations. An analysis of those investigations demonstrates
the transparency of the Department's arguments. The number of
investigations is a statistic that by itself means little. Inevitably,
some of the investigations fail to reveal serious problems, but are
kept "on the books" to demonstrate apparent activity. Where con-
ditions are seriously inadequate, many of the investigations have
been pending for years without resolution, other than that the De-
partment reports that "negotiations" or the "investigations" are
continuing.106 While some degree of negotiation is both appropri-
ate and statutorily required, it is impossible to square negotiations
over periods of years with the supposed presence of egregious, fla-
grant and life-threatening conditions. States have learned that as
long as they appear to be cooperative and agree to submit a "plan"
to remedy some of their institutional problems, they can put off the
Justice Department for years.
In addition, states and localities under investigation are so un-
concerned about the Reagan Justice Department, and so con-
vinced that the Department is not serious about investigating,
litigating, or enforcing the rights of disabled people, that they have
increasingly simply refused to allow the Department's staff to gain
access to their institutions or records. The Department's response
in many of these investigations has been to keep negotiating. 0 7
The Department has denied itself all the negotiation leverage
that CRIPA provided. As discussed above,108 under the statute,
the Department must certify that at least forty-nine days prior to
105. In the Senate Enforcement Hearing, Mr. Reynolds reported that 18 of 41 in-
vestigations instituted since the effective date of CRIPA involved mental
health and mental retardation institutions. Id. at 6. Some of these investiga-
tions were begun by the Carter Administration. In its latest annual report to
Congress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997f (1982), the Department reported that it
initiated five mental health or mental retardation investigations in Fiscal
Year 1983, and that it continued to investigate nine mental health, mental re-
tardation or nursing home institutions pursuant to investigations begun prior
to Oct. 1, 1982. Dept. Justice, 1983 Fiscal Year Rep. to Congress Pursuant to
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
1984 Report].
106. See 1984 Report, supra note 106, at 3, 5, 10-15; Senate Enforcement Hearing,
supra note 1, at 23-26.
107. See 1984 Report, supra note 106, at 4, 6, 8, 11. In response to Hawaii's refusal
to allow the Justice Department access to the state's prisons, the Department
sued the state under CRIPA, only to have the suit dismissed for failing to
comply with the statute's certification requirements. United States v. Hawaii,
564 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D. Haw. 1983).
108. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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filing suit it has advised the relevant state or local officials of the
unconstitutional or illegal conditions in the institution, the sup-
porting facts, and the minimum measures necessary to remedy
those conditions. A Justice Department serious about using its full
authority would send such letters and, if it met with opposition or
foot-dragging, file lawsuits at or soon after the forty-nine day dead-
line. But the Department's so called "49-day letters" do not cite to
the relevant statutory section of CRIPA and do not mention the
possibility that officials' failure to respond adequately to the De-
partment's concerns will lead to litigation.109 Rather, the letters
provide dry, clinical descriptions of findings, vague statements
about remedies (in keeping with the Department's resistance to
proposing specific relief), and delicately stated requests for meet-
ings at the convenience of the officials in question." 0 At times, the
letters are more concerned with stating what the Department will
not do than with what it will do."' The letters also fail to cite stat-
utory authority such as Section 504 or the Education of the Handi-
capped Act as a basis for any relief, despite Congress's reference
in CRIPA to remediation of conditions that violate federal statutes
as well as the Constitution."12
Department officials regularly identify one investigation, that of
the Dixon Developmental Center, an Illinois mental retardation in-
stitution, as an example of the effectiveness of its new approach." 3
They consistently assert that in the face of the Department's inves-
tigation, the Governor chose to close the institution. The problem
with this example, however, is that it is not true. A local television
station ran a series of shows critical of Dixon. At the same time,
Governor Thompson was seeking to make Dixon into a prison in
order to alleviate prison overcrowding in the state. The Depart-
ment's investigation hardly began before the Governor announced
his pre-emptive step of closing Dixon as a mental retardation facil-
ity and turning it into a prison. Thus, Mr. Reynold's claim that the
investigation forced Dixon's closure is disingenuous at best. More-
over, given the Department's reluctance to pursue specific reme-
dies in their cases or investigations, it defies belief to think that the
109. See, e.g., letters reproduced in Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at
63-86.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 74, 80-81.
112. Id. at 160, 163 (statement of Timothy M. Cook). Reference to federal statu-
tory sources for relief would be especially important in light of the Second
Circuit's recent analysis in Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, Nos. 83-7621 & 83-7663 (2d Cir. June 13, 1984), rejecting a federal con-
stitutional right to least restrictive placement, but remanding for considera-
tion of possible federal statutory support for the concept.
113. Id. at 6 (testimony of William Bradford Reynolds).
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Department would ever seek the closure of a large mental retarda-
tion facility.
The Administration's claim that CRIPA demonstrated Con-
gress's dissatisfaction with lengthy litigation" 4 finds no support in
the legislative history, except from a few officials or senators
clearly antagonistic to the goals of the statute." 5 Insofar as the
Department claims that the measure of its success should not be
the number of cases filed but the number of instances in which
"constitutionally intolerable situations have been remedied,"" 6 it
has failed to provide any indication that such a remediation pro-
cess has occurred." 7 Discussions concerning agreements by offi-
cials to submit plans sometime in the future do not demonstrate
the remediation of intolerable conditions. Nor is the Department's
lackluster enforcement record faithful to CRIPA and its history.
The Administration's focus on conciliation to the virtual total ex-
clusion of litigation turns history on its head. Congress hardly
needed to pass a statute empowering the Department to negotiate.
Rather, it passed a statute designed to authorize the Department
to sue recalcitrant state and local officials if unconstitutional insti-
tutional conditions went unremedied, and balanced that authority
with a sensible and not unprecendented requirement that such
suits be filed only after reasonable efforts to induce voluntary co-
operation had failed. But as Congress so clearly foresaw, unless
litigation remained a credible threat, the incentive to negotiate
would be non-existent.
The Reagan Justice Department's approach to institutional re-
form litigation is symptomatic of its ahistorical approach to civil
rights issues generally. In the Bob Jones University case,1 1 8 the
Administration looked at the legal issue of tax exemption for ra-
cially discriminatory schools as if the government's historic com-
mitment to civil rights were non-existent and congressional
interpretations of that commitment irrelevant. So too in the area
114. Id. at 4-5.
115. See, e.g., 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 28 (Sen. Strom Thurmond).
116. Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (testimony of William Brad-
ford Reynolds).
117. In fact, several of the facilities recently reviewed and found wanting by
Health and Human Services Secretary Heckler's staff are under Justice De-
partment investigation. See Senate Enforcement Hearing, supra note 1, at 26;
Heckler Statement, supra note 78. In addition, in response to information
presented at the Senate Enforcement Hearing, Senator Weicker's staff re-
cently completed site visits of several unnamed mental retardation institu-
tions and found numerous problems regarding, inter alia, lack of privacy,
abuse and neglect, and lack of treatment and habilitiation. See generally,
Conditions in Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, Report
to the Chairmen, Senate Subcomm. on the Handicapped (July, 1984).
118. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
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of institutional reform litigation, the Administration has reverted
to a state's rights, "hands off" policy that blithely assumes, con-
trary to the historical record: that state and local officials are ready,
willing, and able to correct unconstitutional conditions without the
threat or fact of litigation; that such officials' protests about exces-
sive federal involvement must always be taken at face value; and
that mere promises to comply with the Constitution are sufficient
to ensure the vindication of institutionalized persons' rights.
The essential question remains, however: is not the Justice De-
partment entitled to act as it sees fit, and are not the disagree-
ments between the Administration and its critics simply
disagreements over legal philosophy, as Department officials con-
tend? I would argue that the "choice" of the Department's role in
institutional reform litigation has already been made through the
previously-described activities of the legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial branches over the past thirteen years. These activities have
reflected a growing societal recognition that institutionalized dis-
abled persons are entitled to the same constitutional protections
as other citizens, and that civil rights law enforcement properly ex-
tends to disabled individuals as well as to blacks and women. Mer-
cifully, the doors of the institution have been pried open; they
cannot now be closed. The Attorney General, as the government's
chief law enforcement officer, and the Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights, as the official primarily responsible for enforce-
ment of the government's civil rights policies, are institutionally
charged with enforcing the rights of all citizens, including disabled
persons. And if there was any doubt about the nation's commit-
ment to enforce the rights of institutionalized persons, the passage
of CRIPA in 1980 removed it. For the Justice Department to ignore
these responsibilities is to consign a group of the nation's citizenry
to oblivion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The one case the Justice Department cites as indicative of its
commitment to the rights of disabled people is the Baby Jane Doe
case. 119 In that case, the Department advocated and litigated vig-
orously for the right of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices to examine hospital records of Baby Jane Doe in order to
ensure that she was not being denied medical care impermissibly
because of her mental and physical handicaps.120 I do not wish to
119. United States v. University Hosp. of the State Univ. of New York, 729 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1984), affg 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
120. For a general discussion of that case, see Comment, Baby Doe Decisions:
Modern Society's Sins of Omission, 63 NEB. L. REV. 888, 889-93 (1984).
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argue the merits of the Department's involvement in the case. But
the irony should not be lost on those who seek to assess the Jus-
tice Department's record in enforcing the rights of mentally dis-
abled persons. The Department is prepared to litigate fully the
important right of one handicapped infant to receive medical treat-
ment on a non-discriminatory basis. But if Baby Jane Doe sur-
vives, the Reagan Administration's cuts in federal funding for
social programs may make her placement in an institution inevita-
ble, or certainly more likely. And once Baby Jane Doe was institu-
tionalized the Department, in all likelihood, would, consistent with
its current policies, refuse to look into the institutional conditions
and treatment to which Baby Jane Doe and her fellow residents
would be subjected because to do so would be too intrusive and
inconsistent with its "hands-off" policy. A policy that leads simul-
taneously to such conclusions is nonsensical.
As a result of its misreading of Youngberg, its reversals in Wy-
att, Pennhurst, and other cases, and its utter failure to enforce
CRIPA, the Department Justice has manifestly failed to extend to
institutionalized disabled persons the rights that are properly
theirs. Where once there was the possibility of justice, there is
now the absence of Justice.
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